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Abstract
Sri Lanka’s Termination of Employment of Workmen Act (TEWA) requires that firms
with 15 or more workers justify layoffs and provide generous severance pay to
displaced workers, with smaller firms being exempted. Although formally subject to
TEWA, firms in Export Promotion Zones (EPZs) do not face the same constraints as
nonEPZ firms due to size incentives and lax labor law enforcement in that sector. In
EPZ, 77% of firms have more than 15 employees while 76% of nonEPZ firms are
smaller than 15 employees. Panel data on all formal sector firms between 1995 and
2003 shows that 80% of the size gap is from sorting of large firms into the EPZ. In
addition, EPZ firms grow faster and are less likely to die than comparably sized nonEPZ
firms. Despite its intent, TEWA lowered employment.
JEL code: J30
Keywords: Firing cost; Employment protection; Firm entry; Firm growth; Threshold;
Export promotion zone; Sri Lanka
1 Introduction
As part of its effort to protect workers from job loss, Sri Lanka adopted the Termin-
ation of Employment of Workman Act (TEWA) in 1971. The act aimed to limit un-
employment by raising the cost of layoffs. It required that each layoff of a covered
worker, whether the layoff involved a single employee or a mass layoff, must be ap-
proved by the government. Until 2003, the government also determined on a case-by-
case basis the level of severance pay that the firm was required to pay to the laid off
workers.
Since its introduction, critics have argued that the TEWA’s non-transparent, discre-
tionary, and costly regulations discourage employment growth, hinder reallocation of
labor from inefficient firms to more profitable sectors, slow the introduction of new
technologies, and increase unemployment. There is at least a prima facie case that the
TEWA policy has affected the size distribution of firms in Sri Lanka compared to that
in 15 other developing countries reported by Leidholm and Mead (1987). Sixty-eight
percent of Sri Lankan firms had 10 or fewer employees, in the top third of small firm
shares in the Leidholm-Mead compilation.1 Only 12% of Sri Lanka firms had over 49
workers which would have given it the second smallest large firm share in the
Leidholm-Mead listing. However, Sri Lanka’s firms in Export Promotion Zones (EPZ)
have a remarkably different size distribution: only 17% of the firms have 10 or fewer
workers and 57% have more than 49. Of all the countries for which we have size-
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distribution information, Sri Lanka’s EPZ firms have the smallest fraction of
workers in firms with fewer than 10 workers and the largest fraction of workers in
firms with over 49 workers. Meanwhile, the reason the overall size distribution in
Sri Lanka is weighted more heavily toward small firms is that the nonEPZ firms
are so unusually small.
Micro-econometric analyses have shown that employment protection policies can
have negative consequences for workers. Heckman and Pages (2000) show that in Latin
America, more stringent job security laws are associated with lower employment and
higher unemployment, particularly among young workers. Similarly, Besley and Burgess
(2004) find that labor regulations in India had important adverse effects on output and
employment. Expanding on that study, Ahsan and Pages (2009) report that regulations
concerned with labor disputes and job security hurt covered workers. Bassanini and
Duval (2006) find that changes in tax and labor policies explain about half of the 1982–
2003 changes in unemployment among OECD countries. Other studies using macro-
economic data have also found negative efficiency effects of severance pay including
Nickell and Layard (1999), Haffner et al. (2001), and the OECD (1999). Nevertheless,
these negative findings from labor market regulations are not universal, particularly
those based on cross-section analysis (Baker et al. 2005).2
This paper adds to this literature by identifying the impacts of the Sri Lanka TEWA
on firm employment and growth. We exploit two sources of variation in the way firms
are treated to identify the policy’s effects. First, the law only applies to firms with more
than 14 workers, and so smaller firms need not comply. Second, firms in EPZ do not
face the same constraints imposed by the TEWA. These sharp differences in policies
applied to firms of different size create several strategic options. Firms that anticipate
growing beyond 14 workers will try to sort into the EPZ to avoid the constraints im-
posed by the law. The cost of growing beyond 14 workers may discourage nonEPZ
firms from growing. Furthermore, the costs imposed by the TEWA may be large
enough to drive covered firms out of business. Panel data on the cohort of all firms
registering for business in Sri Lanka between 1995 and 2002 is used to provide evi-
dence for all three possibilities.
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find that the potential TEWA costs
result in substantially lower firm size in the nonEPZ sector, with the differential incen-
tives to add workers inside and outside the EPZ clearly limiting growth for firms well
below the threshold. EPZ firms have a 26 percentage point larger growth probability
below the 14 worker employment threshold and a 14 percentage point growth advan-
tage above the threshold. In addition, evidence is consistent with the view that the cost
of adding a 15th worker implies a larger marginal cost of expansion for all nonEPZ
firms below the threshold compared to nonEPZ firms already above the threshold, and
so nonEPZ firms above the threshold have more rapid employment growth than
nonEPZ firms below the threshold. NonEPZ firms already above the threshold are 21
percentage points more likely to add employees than are nonEPZ firms below the
threshold. Finally, the results show that the biggest and most significant differences in
survival probability (about 10 percentage point) is the higher exit rate of nonEPZ firms
relative to EPZ firms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an institutional background,
highlighting the intentions of the TEWA at its introduction, and its provisions and
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procedures. It also gives a description of EPZ and nonEPZ firms and description of
the data. Section 3 presents the model highlighting firm entry and exit decisions.
Section 4 describes the empirical section focusing on the need for analysis by firm.
Section 5 presents the empirical results based on the estimation of the multinomial
model of employment growth of firms. Section 6 concludes with a summary and policy
recommendations.
2 Institutional background and data descriptions
2.1 Termination of Employment of Workmen Act
The TEWA was enacted at a time when Sri Lanka was pursuing isolationist economic
policies including an import-substitution industrialization policy, stringent exchange
controls, price controls on many commodities, and a program of nationalization of a
wide-range of establishments (Ranaraja 2005).3 The TEWA applies to all firms employ-
ing 15 or more workers. For covered private firms, all terminations for any reason other
than discipline are regulated by the TEWA, including redundancies arising from
organizational restructuring and financial or economic constraints, temporary lay-offs,
terminations as a result of the business closure, and even incompetence.4 A worker
qualifies as long as he or she worked at least 180 days in the 12 month period preced-
ing the termination.
The TEWA requires that covered employers must seek the consent of the Commis-
sioner General of Labor (CGL) before they are allowed to dismiss workers, even if it
concerns a single worker. The CGL may refuse to sanction the layoff or, if permission
is granted, the employer will be required to pay severance in an amount determined by
the CGL. Over the sample period, the procedure by which the severance is determined
was not specified in law but was subject to a lengthy and seemingly arbitrary deliber-
ation. In December 2003, the TEWA switched to a formula-based severance payment
that is uniformly applied to all firms. While that amendment eliminated the ad hoc de-
termination of the level of severance pay, the other elements of the policy, including
the need for prior approval of layoffs, are still in place.
In dealing with termination applications by employers or complaints by workers, the
CGL has the power of a District Court to conduct inquiries, such as summoning and
compelling the attendance of witnesses, production of records, and recording testi-
mony. The employer must satisfy the CGL that terminating the identified group of
workers is in the best interest of the employer. While the evaluation is going on, the
workers continue to be paid wages and other benefits until the CGL makes a decision,
even where there is no work to be done. The final order of the CGL does not take into
consideration the wages paid by the employer during the inquiry period. Data for 2003
confirm that the TEWA procedure is a very lengthy one - the average processing time
of employer applications was 9.8 months, and it exceeded one year in more than 25
percent of cases (World Bank 2007).
Severance pay was quite generous. During 2002–03, the severance averaged nearly 2
times the monthly salary per year of service, and the multiple could rise as high as 6
times the monthly salary. Judged by international standards, this level of TEWA sever-
ance is extremely high. Using 2002 data, a year for which we have some data on indi-
vidual compensation, we can infer the relationship between generosity of payments and
years of service with the firm. A Sri Lankan worker with 20 years of service received an
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average severance package equal to 29 months of wages. In contrast, the average sever-
ance was 16 months of wages in other Asian countries, 12 months in Latin America,
7 months in Africa, 6 months in the OECD, and 4 months in transition countries.
Sri Lankan workers with shorter duration of prior service were also awarded much
more generous level of severance pay than workers in other countries. Since the
switch to the fixed severance formula in December 2003, the program has become
even more generous (World Bank 2007).
The high turnover costs imposed by the TEWA have led to a relatively small number
of applications for separations by employers. Between 2000 and 2003, of more than 80
thousand covered firms, annual filings for the right to initiate a separation varied from
71 to 105 applications (World Bank 2007). Less than half of these cases were concluded
by the order of the commissioner because they were settled “voluntarily”, whether be-
cause the firm withdrew the application or induced the worker to retire voluntarily
with retirement packages that ranged from 6 to 45 months of wages. As is apparent,
it is difficult for firms to avoid the costs of the TEWA. Inflexible labor regulations
were one of the five most commonly cited business challenges reported by urban firms in
Sri Lanka5.
Firms in EPZ were reported to be given a preferential treatment that allowed them to
limit or avoid the costs of the TEWA. Because EPZ firms were technically subject to
the same regulations, the extent of the lax enforcement is difficult to quantify, but any
preferential treatment should be apparent when comparing EPZ firm personnel deci-
sions relative to those of nonEPZ firms. In addition, EPZ firms were eligible for many
Board of Investments (BOI) incentives that rewarded firm growth. The size distribution
of firms inside and outside the EPZ is summarized in Table 1. Large firms are atypically
located in EPZ. Only 22.5% of EPZ firms have fewer than 14 workers compared to
75.6% of nonEPZ firms! In contrast, the EPZ firms are over 3 times more likely than
nonEPZ firms to have grown beyond the threshold employment level. It certainly ap-
pears that the incentives to grow must differ between the two groups of firms.
Table 1 also shows that there are apparent differences in the probability that firms in-
crease or decrease their workforce. NonEPZ firms are much more likely than EPZ firms
to reduce or maintain their current employment level, regardless of size. EPZ firms are
Table 1 Distribution of Sri Lanka firms by initial size, change in employment over the
years, and EPZ status (%), 1995 – 2003
EPZ firms Percent of sample Shrink Stay Grow Total
Less than 14 workers 22.5 29.3 26.7 44.0 100.0
14 workers 1.1 45.8 13.6 40.7 100.0
More than 14 workers 76.4 45.4 2.2 52.4 100.0
Total EPZ workers = 5,441
Non EPZ firms Percent of sample Shrink Stay Grow Total
Less than 14 workers 75.6 37.2 40.8 22.0 100.0
14 workers 1.2 53.9 13.2 32.9 100.0
More than 14 workers 23.2 55.8 5.1 39.1 100.0
Total nonEPZ workers = 320,866
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the universe of all formal sector firms in Sri Lanka, 1995–2003.
EPZ: Export Promotion Zone.
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much more likely to add to their employment base. The largest contrast in probability
of employment growth is below the threshold: the smallest EPZ firms are twice as likely
to increase employment compared to nonEPZ firms. If it is true that the cost of hiring
is lower for EPZ firms, then the pattern of employment growth and decline would
differ between EPZ and non-EPZ firms.
In Figure 1, we illustrate the probability of firm employment growth and decline in
EPZ and nonEPZ firms around the 14–15 employee threshold. Immediately we see that
EPZ firms are more likely to grow and nonEPZ firms are more likely to shrink at all
firm sizes, an outcome that will prove consistent with the theory. NonEPZ firms are
modestly more likely to both shrink and grow above the threshold, compared to
nonEPZ firms below the threshold. In other settings, small firms are the most likely to
both grow and shrink and so we would expect these lines to slope downward absent
any constraints on firm choice (Evans 1987; Cabral 1995; Arkolakis 2013). The patterns
for EPZ firms are harder to discern due to relatively small numbers at each firm size. It
appears that EPZ firms are also more likely to grow above the threshold but there is no
obvious change in the probability of firm shrinkage around the threshold.
At 14 workers where the 15th worker would trigger compliance with the TEWA, for
EPZ firms the probability of employment growth decreases and the probability of firm
employment decline increases. NonEPZ firms have the same pattern but the difference
is only a few percentage points. The lack of massing at 14 employees outside the EPZ
may seem surprising. However, firms wanting to avoid the TEWA would be expected
to remain below 15 employees, but their constrained optimum employment choice
may not be exactly at 14 workers. As a result, the TEWA would be expected to create
higher probability of firms shrinking above the threshold and lower probability of firms
growing below the threshold, a result that is supported by the patterns in Figure 1.
Moreover, data measurement errors (see above) may also contribute to less pronounced
differences in observed behavior at the threshold.
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Figure 1 Probability of firm employment growth and decline above and below the 14 worker
threshold, by firm size and EPZ status, 1995–2003 averages.
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To further isolate the effect of the TEWA, we need to remove the effects of firm ob-
served and unobserved productivity attributes from the analysis. In addition, the TEWA
effect will be spread across firm decisions to expand, remain at current size, or shrink
in the face of external shocks. That will require a more structured analysis of the
data.
2.2 Data description
To test for differences in firm location, growth and decline between EPZ and nonEPZ
sectors, we make use of a unique panel data set that includes annual employment data
for 80,560 firms in Sri Lanka over the 1995–2003 periods. The period coincides with a
consistent set of restrictions on layoffs. Those policies were relaxed modestly at the
end of 2003. The data are compiled by the Sri Lanka Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF)
on all private sector firms and workers paying contributions to the fund. All registered
firms regardless of size are required to pay contributions for their workers. The data
are maintained by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.
The data are quite limited, however. Apart from the number of workers employed
during the year, the only other information contained in the database is the firm’s name
and region: each firm is designated as having a base in one of 24 regions. The name al-
lows us to identify which firms belong to an EPZ. The Sri Lankan Board of Investment
provided us a list of names for firms that operate in EPZs. We matched these names
with 1,124 firms in the EPF list, and these firms comprise our EPZ group.
The EPF data are not free of problems. The data set only contains workers for whom
the firm paid contributions during the year. If for whatever reason such contributions
are not paid, the true number of workers in the firm will deviate from the number re-
ported to the EPF. The most frequent reason for such discrepancies is the presence of
financial difficulties that prevent a firm from paying contributions in the current year.
Even delayed payments are not used to correct the data retrospectively. Therefore,
these employment numbers will only reflect the contemporaneously reported number
of workers for whom the firm is making an EPF contribution. The frequency or magni-
tude of this measurement error is not known.
Also, the nature of the data does not allow us to differentiate between quits and lay-
offs and so we assume that any net loss of workers is due to layoffs. This seems reason-
able, as workers who quit will presumably be replaced, resulting in no employment
loss. We will discuss further in the empirical section on how we exploit the nature of
the data to understand firm size decision.
The data also provide information on firms in different years. We make use of the
longitudinal nature of the data to specifically identify cohorts of firms and follow their
evolution over time. Thus firms that do not make contributions in 1995 but started
paying contribution in 1996 are considered to be one cohort and are followed until
2003. The same is done for subsequent years. The identification of different cohorts in
the data has the advantage of reducing heterogeneity and provides for a simple test of
selection to explain firm size distribution and location in EPZ or nonEPZ region.
As the summary data in Table 1 reveal, there are substantial differences in average firm
size and growth patterns consistent with differences in the marginal cost of hiring across
the EPZ and nonEPZ regions. To evaluate the strength of that correlation more formally,
we next propose a theoretical model to understand firm entry and exit decision.
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3 Firm entry decisions: How much of the gap in size distribution between
EPZ and nonEPZ firms is due to sorting by firm size at entry?
3.1 Theory
Firms face two interrelated decisions at the time of entry designated by subscript 0:
whether to locate in an EPZ zone and how much labor (L0) and capital (K0) to employ.
We assume that there is a fixed entry cost, FEPZ0 ; that firms incur from attaining EPZ
status. These costs would include all official and under-the-table costs of applying for
and attaining EPZ status plus any additional business expenses associated with location
or entry6. In exchange, the firm receives benefits from alleged lax enforcement of the
TEWA and preferential tax treatment and exemption from export duties applied to
worker output. That distinction sets up the comparison between EPZ and nonEPZ
firms for the empirical work.
We summarize the distinction with a parameter δk that measures the cost of compli-
ance with the TEWA net of any benefits from being in the EPZ. The superscript k de-
notes the cost of compliance in E: EPZ or N: nonEPZ. The measure of δk is a positive
or negative proportional markup over the wage. If the firm is nonEPZ, the δk ≥ 0, with
a positive markup if the firm has more than 14 employees so that it faces possible sev-
erance and related firing costs that are proportional to the wage. If the firm is in the
EPZ, we expect δE ≤ δN because of lax enforcement of TEWA requirements, and δE
may even be negative if the firm receives tax benefits and/or subsidies tied to firm size.
All firms, EPZ or nonEPZ, have to pay market wages, w0 and so the hourly labor cost
per worker is w0(1 + δ
K). All nonEPZ firms with L0 < 15 face δ
N = 0 and pay w0 per
hour for labor, while all nonEPZ firms with L0 ≥ 15 pay w0(1 + δ
N) per hour; δN > 0. All
EPZ firms pay w0(1 + δ
N) ≤w0(1 + δN) when compared with equally sized nonEPZ
firms.
Assuming the firm’s production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form
Q0 ¼ Aτ0LαL0 KαK0 ð1Þ
The variable τ0 is a permanent exogenous technology shock to labor productivity that
takes an initial value of unity. The production parameters are defined by A > 0, 0 < αL < 1,
and 0 < αK < 1. Setting output price at unity and cost of capital as r, the firm’s initial
optimum input levels L0 and K

0 are set by the first-order conditions:
αLAτ0L
αL‐1
0 K
αK
0 ¼ w0 1þ δk
  ð2AÞ
αKAτ0L
αL
0 K
αK‐1
0 ¼ r ð2BÞ
An entering firm will decide on whether to enter the EPZ by comparing anticipated
profits with and without EPZ status. For firms with L0 < 15, profits are higher in the
nonEPZ state if δE > 0, or if δE < 0 and w0δ
EL0
r
  < FEPZ0 where the term on the left of the
inequality is the discounted value of the stream of anticipated EPZ subsidies. The cost
advantage for small firms locating in the nonEPZ sector is that they are exempt from
TEWA costs and also avoid paying FEPZ0 . For firms with L

0≥15, it is optimal to get EPZ
status when FEPZ0 <
δNw0L0
r ; where the term on the right is the discounted value of the
stream of anticipated TEWA payments in perpetuity. Consequently, it is possible for a
firm planning to have 15 or more employees to select the nonEPZ sector. Presuming
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firms face the same market wages, capital costs, potential EPZ benefits, and potential
TEWA costs, the firms most likely to sort into the EPZ sector have the largest initial
employment levels, L0.
This simple model shows that small firms will tend to sort into nonEPZ and large
firms into EPZ at the time of entry, conditional on prevailing wages, capital costs and
technology. That suggests that empirical analysis of the size distribution of firms must
compare firms facing the same prices and technologies at the time of entry. Moreover,
empirical studies have consistently shown that firm growth rates and death rates are
initially both slow with firm age and so we need to standardize firm age to generate ac-
curate transition probabilities (Evans 1987; Cabral 1995; Arkolakis 2013). These argu-
ments dictate our use of cohorts of newly born firms for our analysis.
3.2 Evidence of the impact of sorting on the gap in firm size between EPZ and nonEPZ
Table 2 provides summary information on the size distribution of firms in EPZ and
nonEPZ regions for successive entry cohorts from 1996 through 2002. Recall that the
overall percentage of firms with at least 15 employees is 76% in the EPZ and 23% in
the nonEPZ (see Table 1). The proportion of EPZ firms already above 14 workers at
entry varies between 53% and 70% with an average of 62%. It is apparent that the EPZ
firms quickly add workers with the fraction above 15 workers rising 2.5% per year aver-
aged across the cohorts. If 76% is taken as the final percentage of firms employing over
15 workers, sorting of large firms into EPZ is responsible for about 80% of the EPZ size
distribution.
In the nonEPZ sector, only 9% of the firms in a cohort start with at least 15 em-
ployees, and the fraction actually decrease through the first few years. By 2003, 8% of
these seven firm entry cohorts had 15 or more workers. It is apparent that the nonEPZ
firms do not grow as readily as the EPZ firms. While we cannot argue with certainty
that the proximate cause is the TEWA, the results are consistent with the predicted im-
pact of the TEWA on firm entry decisions.
There is a 53 percentage point gap between the worker distribution of EPZ and
nonEPZ firms in the population as shown in Table 1. The average gap at entry between
large EPZ and nonEPZ firms is also 53 percentage points as shown in Table 2. How-
ever, the population measure excludes firms that have died, while the cohort estimates
Table 2 Distribution of EPZ and non EPZ firms at entry (1996) and the end of
sample (2003)
% large
at entry,
EPZ
% large
in 2003,
EPZ
% large
at entry,
non EPZ
% large
in 2003,
non EPZ
% of large
firms at entry
that is EPZ
% of large
firms in 2003
that is EPZ
% of firms
in EPZ at
entry
1996 55 71 11 9 6 10 1
1997 67 72 12 10 7 9 1
1998 62 68 10 8 9 12 2
1999 65 67 8 7 10 11 1
2000 70 76 11 10 9 10 1
2001 53 65 8 7 8 10 1
2002 60 65 8 8 9 11 1
Average 62 69 9 8 8 10 1
Source: Authors’ calculations based n the universe of all formal sector firms in Sri Lanka, 1995–2003.
EPZ: Export Promotion Zone.
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at entry include all firms. It is possible that the fraction of firms with over 15 employees
will grow because small firms add workers over time, or it may be that the fraction in-
creases because small firms are more likely to die. As we will see, sorting at entry is an
important source of the difference between EPZ and nonEPZ firm size distributions,
but differential growth and death rates also play a role.
4 Can the TEWA affect firm employment growth and death?
4.1 Theory
When firms commit to their initial capital stock and decide whether or not to enter the
EPZ, they do not know the future path of prices and technology. Having committed to
a capital stock and a location, their response to these changing economic circumstances
is limited to labor adjustments in the short run. At some future time, t, the condition
setting their short-run employment level will be
αLAτtL
αL−1
t K
αK
0 ≥wt 1þ δk
  ð3AÞ
The firm’s optimal labor allocation is conditioned on the initial capital investment at
entry. It is also affected by the evolution of technology, τt, and wages, wt.
7
We let technology evolve according to:
ln τtð Þ ¼ ln τt−1ð Þ þ η0 þ ηt; ηteN 0; σ2η  ð3BÞ
The variable η0 is the trend growth in technology known by all firms at the time of
entry, but ηt is an unforeseeable but permanent technology innovation that the firm
cannot control. This specification for τt presumes that the firm’s labor productivity is a
random walk process about the trend. We assume similarly that market wages (wt)
evolve according to a random walk process with a known drift8 so that
ln wtð Þ ¼ ln wt−1ð Þ þ ω0 þ ωt; ωteN 0; σ2ω  ð3CÞ
The variable ω0 is the trend growth in wages known by all firms at the time of entry,
but ωt is an unforeseeable but permanent innovation in wages that the firm cannot
control.
We can model the changes in the firm’s employment decisions by applying 3A-C to
two successive years and solving for the change in desired labor. From here on, we de-
fine the notional firm input demand that would hold at an interior solution in period t
as Lt and K

t . The form of the decision depends on whether the firm comes under the
TEWA policy. We examine several cases that will illustrate the range of possible re-
sponses to the TEWA system. Recall that we are assuming that EPZ firms are exempt
from all TEWA requirements in forming these responses, an assumption that we will
test with the data.
4.1.1 Case 1: Firm is exempt from TEWA with δN = 0 and δE ≤ 0 in both periods with Lt−1* <15
and Lt
* <15
Assuming interior solutions, the change in desired labor is governed by ln LtLt−1
 
¼ ηt−ωt1−αLð Þ.
The firm is not constrained by the severance policy and adjusts labor upward with positive
labor productivity shocks and negative wage shocks. If EPZ firms receive favorable subsid-
ies so that δE < 0 , comparable adverse shocks are less likely to cause the left hand side of
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(3A) to fall below the right-hand side for EPZ firms compared to nonEPZ firms. As a con-
sequence, below the threshold, nonEPZ firms are more likely to shrink or less likely to ex-
pand compared to EPZ firms.
4.1.2 Case 2: Firm is covered by TEWA so δN > δE>< 0 in both periods because Lt−1
* ≥15 and
L t
*≤15
Assuming interior solutions, the change in desired labor is also governed by
ln LtLt−1
 
¼ ηt−ωt1−αLð Þ and so optimal labor demand responds as with the exempt firms in
Case 1. However, even at their optimum labor allocations, the nonEPZ firms face a
constant disadvantage of having higher labor costs and more distorted capital labor
ratios compared to their EPZ competitors. As before, comparable adverse shocks
are more likely to lead to violations of the first order condition (3A) for nonEPZ
firms than EPZ firms. In addition, even if they are at their optimum labor alloca-
tion, nonEPZ firm profit levels will be lower than that of comparably sized EPZ
firms because of their higher labor costs. As a result, above the threshold, nonEPZ
firms are more likely to shrink and less likely to expand compared to equally sized
EPZ firms.
4.1.3 Case 3: Firm has Lt−1
* ≥15 and considers remaining below the threshold in period t even
though Lt
*≤15 if the firm is exempt from the TEWA
In this case, assume first that employment in t-1 is fixed by the interior solution of 3A-C
such that Lt−1 < 15. However, in the next period, the firm’s optimal staffing would move it
into the covered region:
αLAτtL
αL−1
t K
αK
0 ¼ wt→Lt ≥15
αLAτtL
αL−1
t K
αK
0 < wt 1þ δkLt
 
; ∀Lt ≥15; δ > 0
This is the case where the firm would want to expand beyond 14 employees if it faced
the market wage alone. However, in moving beyond 14 employees, the firm has to pay
for the TEWA severance system for all Lt workers, leading to an even larger increase
in the marginal cost of adding any workers beyond 14. As a consequence, the firm
will set their staffing at some second-best level Lt < 15 and where the marginal product
αLAτtL
αL−1
t K
αK
0 > wt.
9 Because δN > δE, it is more likely that nonEPZ firms will decide
not to expand beyond 14 workers compared to EPZ firms.
4.2 Empirical framework
The discussion illustrates that the TEWA can alter the incentives for nonEPZ firms to
expand or shrink compared to similarly sized EPZ firms. Both above and below the
threshold, the combination of special tax and subsidy treatments from the EPZ and the
costs of compliance with the TEWA create conditions that increase the likelihood that
nonEPZ firms will shrink or fail to grow compared to their EPZ counterparts. At the
threshold, nonEPZ firms are more likely to face additional labor costs that cause them
to remain below the threshold. As we show in this section, these predictions can be
tested with longitudinal data on cohorts of firms entering business at the same time.
The use of a common startup date is important for two reasons. First, all firms will
be exposed to the same information on wages, technology and macroeconomic
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conditions, greatly simplifying the specification of common shocks. Second, a sample
of the universe of all starting firms avoids the selection bias that would exist had we
been constrained to a sample of surviving firms in which the weakest would have been
already eliminated.
The empirical section described below can be viewed in the difference-in-differences
framework, using firms at or above the severance threshold as the treatment group,
and those with fewer than 14 workers and those in EPZs as control groups. The first
control group follows naturally from the design of the TEWA system, because the regu-
lations do not apply to firms employing less than 15 workers. The second control group
is formed based on the assumption that enforcement is ineffective in EPZs, allowing
firms to escape paying separation costs as dictated by TEWA.
4.2.1 Measuring the TEWA effect on probability of firm growth
We begin by applying an interior solution to (3A) which defines the firm’s notional
demand in period t as
αL−1ð ÞlnLt ¼ ln
wt 1þ δk
 
αLAτtK
αK
0
 !
ð4AÞ
The first order condition for notional employment in period t + 1 is
αL−1ð ÞlnLtþ1 ¼ ln
wtþ1 1þ δk
 
αLAτtþ1K
αK
0
 !
¼ αL−1ð ÞlnLt þ ωtþ1−ηtþ1 ð4BÞ
where we apply (4A), (3B) and (3C). Rearranging, we have that the change in notional
employment from t to t + 1 is
ln
Ltþ1
Lt
 
¼ η0 þ ηtþ1 − ω0− ωtþ1
1−αLð Þ ð5Þ
which means that if firm employment evolves without frictions, the change in notional
employment will be a random walk with drift. Employment increases with trend growth
and unexpected innovations in technology and decreases with expected wage increases
and positive wage shocks. Importantly, the firm-specific Hicksian productivity factor A
is differenced away, and so labor demand or supply shifts related to firm-specific unob-
servable productivity, firm location, or industry are held constant in the frictionless so-
lution. However, the constraints on maximization caused by the TEWA will mean that
actual firm employment growth will deviate from the frictionless outcome. The greater
frictions in the nonEPZ sector should be apparent when we compare employment
changes in those firms with the less constrained employment growth in the EPZ sector
above, at and below the threshold.
This simple model does not take into account the stylized facts about firm growth by
firm age and size. Our assessment of the literature suggests that these tendencies are
unlikely to cause faster growth in the EPZ sector. First, as noted above, firm growth
rates tend to decrease with firm age (Evans 1987; Cabral 1995; Arkolakis 2013). This
will not bias comparisons across EPZ and nonEPZ firms, but it will induce a downward
trend in longitudinal firm growth rates within the sectors. Potentially of greater con-
cern is a second stylized result that exporting firms tend to grow faster than non-
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exporting firms which could bias the comparison across the EPZ and nonEPZ firms.
However, extensive reviews of the empirical literature by Wagner (2007), Wagner
(2012) and Singh (2010) suggest that the productivity advantage to exporting firms
is driven by the sorting of more efficient firms into the export sector, similar to our own
finding that larger firms enter the EPZ sector while smaller firms enter the nonEPZ sec-
tor. In contrast, there is no consistent evidence that the act of exporting raises firm
growth rates. Again, these past findings suggest that the comparison across EPZ and
nonEPZ sectors will not be biased by the act of exporting after controlling for the initial
conditions at time of entry. In fact, evidence suggests that the highest firm growth rates
among exporting firms are concentrated among the very small firms, while larger firms
have growth rates near zero (Arkolakis 2013). If true, the bias would actually go against
finding faster growth rates in the EPZ sector as firm size increases.
Actual employment changes for the ith firm are modeled as an approximation to the
firm’s notional employment changes as
ln
Litþ1
Lit
 
¼ β0 þ βEPZEPZi þ βL−EL
−
it þ βLþEL
þ
it þ γL−EL
−
it þ γLþEL
þ
it
n o
 EPZi
þ ηi0 − ωi0
1−αLð Þ þ
ηitþ1− ωitþ1
1−αLð Þ ð6Þ
This specification adds terms to (5) that allow differential responses to the wage and
technology shocks depending on whether the firm is inside or outside the EPZ and
whether its employment level lies above or below the threshold. The constant β0 corre-
sponds to the base case which is set to be the anticipated employment change at a firm
with Lit = 14 in a nonEPZ region. The other possible employment levels in period t are
indicated by a dummy variable EL
−
it when employment is below 14 and E
Lþ
it when em-
ployment is above 14. The corresponding coefficients differentiate between employ-
ment growth effects below the threshold ( βL− ) and above the threshold ( βLþ ). The
dummy variable EPZi indicates that the firm is in an export promotion zone. Given the
other parameters, the coefficient βEPZ measures the difference in employment growth
between EPZ and nonEPZ firms at the threshold Lit = 14. The γL− capture additional
differences in employment growth between EPZ and nonEPZ below the threshold and
γLþ measures additional differences between the sectors above the threshold. If EPZ
firms face fewer frictions in employment adjustments because of partial or full immun-
ity from the TEWA or other benefits associated with EPZ status, γL− and γLþ will be
positive and significant. The γL− and γLþ may differ from one another if there are differ-
ent relative regulatory costs between EPZ and nonEPZ sectors above and below the
threshold.
Our last requirement to estimate (6) is to operationalize the random walk and drift
terms. The wage and technology trend terms are firm-specific and reflect information
known at the time of entry. We approximate these terms by ηi0 − ωi01−αLð Þ ¼ φLln Li0ð Þ þ φ0
where the initial employment level reflects the firm’s anticipated input needs based on
what the firm knew at the time of entry and the second term is a cohort-specific term
reflecting common expectations of the drift terms held by all firms entering at the same
time. The second term requires that we control for a common fixed effect for all firms
in the entry cohort. Inclusion of these terms helps to control for nonrandom sorting
into firm size groups across firms and across entry cohorts.
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The random walk terms are i.i.d. errors when we estimate one period employment
changes. We let Λit¼ ηitþ1− ωitþ11−αLð Þ be the composite error term in the employment change
relationship. If Λit is distributed extreme value, then (6) can be posed as a multinomial
logit specification. If we further define the term ΔΛt + 1 as a trichotomous variable and
define the right-hand side terms excluding ϵit as Z
0
itΒ
Λ , the estimable variant of (6) that
will yield the parameters of interest is
ΔΛtþ1 ¼ 1 if ln Litþ1Lit
 
−Z
0
itΒ
Λ < Λit
ΔΛtþ1 ¼ 2 if ln Litþ1Lit
 
−Z
0
itΒ
Λ ¼ Λit
ΔΛtþ1 ¼ 3 if ln Litþ1Lit
 
−Z
0
itΒ
Λ > Λit
ð7Þ
Table 3 summarizes the identification and interpretation of the coefficients. The first
column shows the parameters describing firm growth for EPZ firms below, at and
above the threshold. The second column shows the corresponding parameter estimates
for nonEPZ firms. The first differences of the nonEPZ estimates allow us to identify βL−
and βLþ . The double difference allows us to identify γL− and γLþ . βL− > 0 indicates fas-
ter growth than the base case for nonEPZ firms below 14 workers. Similarly, βLþ > 0
indicates faster employment growth than the base case for nonEPZ firms above 14
workers. βEPZ þ γL− > 0 indicates that EPZ firms are growing faster than nonEPZ firms
below 14 workers and βEPZ þ γLþ > 0 indicates that EPZ firms are growing faster than
nonEPZ firms above 14 workers. The coefficient βEPZ tells us if EPZ firms grow faster
than nonEPZ firms at the threshold. These coefficient estimates form the basis of our
hypothesis tests.
4.2.2 Measuring the TEWA effect on probability of Firm Death
Even with perfect foresight, firms will not completely avoid the TEWA costs by sorting
into or out of the EPZ. NonEPZ firms face a labor cost disadvantage every period be-
cause δN ≥ δE both above and below the threshold. Because nonEPZ firms will pay an
artificially high labor cost per hour, they will pick an inefficiently high ratio of capital
per worker. The higher input costs than their EPZ competitors also leave them more
Table 3 Parameters controlling the probability of employment growth by type of firms
Type of firm
Employment in period t EPZ Non EPZ Difference
Firm employment growth effects below the threshold
EL
−
it ¼ 1 : Lit−1≤13 βL− þ βEPZ þ γL− βL− βEPZ þ γL−
Lit = 14 βEPZ reference βEPZ
Difference βL− þ γL− βL− γL−
Firm employment growth effects above the threshold
EL
þ
it ¼ 1 : Lit≥15 βLþ þ βEPZ þ γLþ βLþ βEPZ þ γLþ
Lit = 14 βEPZ reference βEPZ
Difference βLþ þ γLþ βLþ γLþ
EPZ: Export Promotion Zone.
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exposed to adverse wage or technology shocks, increasing the probability that nonEPZ
firms will shrink or fail.
We can test the hypothesized greater likelihood of firm death for nonEPZ firms using
a similar specification as in (7) but with an alternative dependent variable. The details
of the parameterizations follow exactly from the previous section except that the ex-
pected signs are opposite those for firm growth. We denote the composite error term
as Υit¼ ηitþ1− ωitþ11−αLð Þ which we assume is distributed extreme value. Then, we can derive a
binomial logit specification for firm deaths which are indicated by unit values of the di-
chotomous variable ΔΥT + 1. Denoting the terms on the right-hand side of (7) excluding
the error as Z
0
itΒ
Υ , we can define firm deaths by
ΔΥtþ1 ¼ 1 if ln Litþ1Lit
 
−Z
0
itΒ
Y≤ Yit
ΔΥtþ1 ¼ 0 if ln Litþ1Lit
 
−Z
0
itΒ
Y > Yit
ð8Þ
where a firm death occurs when the notional reduction in staffing from year t to t + 1
is sufficiently large that it is more profitable for the firm to exit than to remain in
operation with reduced staffing. If the additional costs faced by nonEPZ firms are
sufficiently large compared to EPZ firms, then we would find negative values for
βEPZ, γL− and γLþ .
5 Can the TEWA affect firm employment growth and death?
In Table 4 and Table 5, we present the results of our estimation of the firm employ-
ment growth and firm death equations, estimated over the pooled firm entry cohorts
from 1996 through 2002. These firms are followed annually until 2003, and so their
growth and decline is tracked from one to seven years after entry. Constant terms for
cohort year of birth are used to correct for the common information on macroeco-
nomic conditions that shape anticipated price, wage and technology trends at the time
of entry. The firm’s initial employment level is used as a proxy for firm-specific infor-
mation on technologies and wages that shaped the initial profit maximizing employ-
ment level. These parameters are estimated, but not reported10.
For ease of interpretation, all estimated coefficients are converted into their implied
transition probabilities. Therefore, all results reported in Table 4 and Table 5 reflect the
marginal effects by EPZ or nonEPZ status of the prior year’s employment level on the
probability of employment growth, decline, or firm death. We report the reduced form
coefficients in the upper panel and the lower panel presents the values of the hypoth-
eses tests and the test statistics.
5.1 Employment growth and decline inside and outside the EPZ
The reduced form parameters give the average annual probability of employment
growth relative to the reference firm which is a nonEPZ firm with 14 employees in year
t. Smaller EPZ firms are 9 percentage points more likely to add workers than the refer-
ence firm. In contrast, smaller nonEPZ firms are nearly 17 percentage points less likely
to add workers than a reference firm! Therefore, the differential incentives to add
workers inside and outside the EPZ clearly limit growth for firms well below the
threshold. As indicated in the theory section, there is no reason to believe that the
Abidoye et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2014) 3:36 Page 14 of 20
constrained optimal employment level for a firm facing a substantial added cost of
employing 15 workers would be 14 workers. This finding suggests that potential TEWA
costs result in substantially lower firm size in the nonEPZ sector, even for firms well
below the 14 firm threshold.
Above the threshold, EPZ firms are 19 percentage points more likely to add workers
than the reference nonEPZ firm with 14 workers. In contrast, nonEPZ firms already
above the threshold are 5 percentage points more likely to add workers than the refer-
ence firm. Because firm adding a 15th worker face additional costs on all 15 workers,
we would expect a larger marginal cost to expansion for firms at the threshold com-
pared to those already above the threshold.
Turning to the structural estimates, EPZ firms at the threshold are 12 percentage
points more likely to add workers than the reference nonEPZ firm at the threshold, a
difference that easily meets any standard significance criteria. The hypothesis that EPZ
firms grow faster than comparably sized nonEPZ firms in the same entry cohort either
above or below the threshold also passes any standard significance criteria. These ef-
fects are not small: 26 percentage point larger growth probability for firms below the
threshold and a 14 percentage point growth advantage for firms above the threshold.
This is overwhelming support of the hypothesis that firms in the EPZ grow faster than
firms with identical initial size and year of entry in the nonEPZ sector.
Table 4 Reduced form and structural estimates of the probability of employment growth
conditional on prior employment level inside and outside Enterprise Protection Zones as
per equation (6) using Probit model with cluster robust standard errors
Reduced form parameters: EPZi = 1 Marginal effect
a
Lit≤13; EL
−
it ¼ 1 : βL− þ βEPZ þ γL− 0.089** (0.023)
Lit = 14 : βEPZ 0.123 (0.079)
Lit≥15; EL
þ
it ¼ 1 : βLþ þ βEPZ þ γLþ 0.190** (0.019)
Reduced form parameters: EPZi = 0
Lit≤13; EL
−
it ¼ 1 : βL− -0.166** (0.015)
Lit = 14: reference −
Lit≥15; EL
þ
it ¼ 0 : βLþ 0.048** (0.013)
Structural estimates
Hypothesis: Relative to nonEPZ firms of like size and vintage… Marginal effectb
βEPZ > 0: EPZ firms grow faster at the threshold 0.123** (224.1)
βEPZ þ γL− > 0: EPZ firms grow faster below the threshold 0.255** (160.7)
βEPZ þ γLþ > 0: EPZ firms grow faster above the threshold 0.142** (2952)
Hypothesis: Relative to same sector firms below the threshold…
βLþ−βL− > 0: nonEPZ firms grow faster above the threshold 0.214** (21.2)
βLþ þ γLþð Þ− βL− þ γL−ð Þ > 0: EPZ firms grow faster above the threshold 0.101** (41.5)
Hypothesis: Relative to EPZ firms at the threshold….
γL− ¼ 0 : EPZ firms grow at a different rate below the threshold 0.133* (3.5)
γLþ ¼ 0 : EPZ firms grow at a different rate above the threshold 0.020 (0.01)
Log-likelihood value of −94817.0 with 79% of the observation predicted correctly.
aMarginal effect reported with attached standard error in parenthesis.
bMarginal effect reported with attached Chi-square statistic in parentheses. Critical value is 3.84 at the .05 significance
level.
*significance at the 0.1 level. **significance at the .05 level.
EPZ: Export Promotion Zone.
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The TEWA costs tend to keep nonEPZ firms small. NonEPZ firms below the thresh-
old are 17 percentage points less likely to grow than are firms at the threshold, defying
the tendency for firm growth rates to decrease with firm size. In contrast, EPZ firms
below the threshold are more likely to add workers, consistent with the unconstrained
pattern of firm growth by size found elsewhere. nonEPZ firms that manage to cross the
threshold are 5% more likely to grow than the firms at the threshold who face very
large marginal costs of the 15th worker, and are 21 percentage points more likely to
add employees than are nonEPZ firms below the threshold. In contrast, there are no
significant differences between employment growth probabilities of EPZ firms at or
above the threshold. The differences in growth probability between EPZ above and
below the threshold are only marginally significant. In short, growth rates for EPZ firms
are quite similar to the unconstrained random walk with drift, while the pattern for
nonEPZ firms is very different from the typical pattern of the fastest growth rates con-
centrated among the smallest firms.
5.1.1 Firm death inside and outside the EPZ
Table 5 reports the marginal probabilities of firm exit by current firm size and sector.
EPZ firms below and above the threshold are 7 and 9 percentage points less likely to
Table 5 Reduced form and structural estimates of the probability of firm death
conditional on prior employment level inside and outside Enterprise Protection Zones as
per equation (7) using Probit model with cluster robust standard errors
Reduced form parameters: EPZi = 1 Marginal effect
a
Lit≤13; EL
−
it ¼ 1 : βL− þ βEPZ þ γL− −0.073** (0.011)
Lit = 14 : βEPZ −0.032 (0.062)
Lit≥15; EL
þ
it ¼ 1 : βLþ þ βEPZ þ γLþ −0.093** (0.009)
Reduced form parameters: EPZi = 0
Lit≤13; EL
−
it ¼ 1 : βL− 0.023** (0.011)
Lit = 14: reference −
Lit≥15; EL
þ
it ¼ 0 : βLþ 0.004 (0.012)
Structural estimates
Hypothesis: Relative to nonEPZ firms of like size and vintage… Marginal effectb
βEPZ < 0: EPZ firms survive more readily at the threshold −0.032** (66.4)
βEPZ þ γL− < 0: EPZ firms survive more readily below the threshold −0.096** (72.6)
βEPZ þ γLþ < 0: EPZ firms survive more readily above the threshold −0.096** (30.1)
Hypothesis: Relative to firms in the same sector below the threshold…
βLþ−βL− < 0: nonEPZ firms survive more readily above the threshold −0.022 (1.22)
βLþ þ γLþð Þ− βL− þ γL−ð Þ < 0: EPZ firms survive more readily above the threshold −0.020 (0.266)
Hypothesis: Relative to EPZ firms at the threshold….
γL− ¼ 0: EPZ firms below the threshold have a different survival rate −0.064 (1.22)
γLþ ¼ 0 : EPZ firms above the threshold have a different survival rate −0.065 (1.66)
Log-likelihood value of −77956.7 with 85% of the observation predicted correctly.
aMarginal effect reported with attached standard error in parenthesis.
bMarginal effect reported with attached Chi-square statistic in parentheses. Critical value is 3.84 at the .05 significance
level.
*significance at the 0.1 level. **significance at the .05 level.
EPZ: Export Promotion Zone.
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exit in a given year compared to comparably sized nonEPZ firms of the same vintage.
At the threshold, EPZ firms are 3 percentage points less likely to exit but the estimate
is not precise. NonEPZ firms below the threshold are the most likely to die at a 2 per-
centage point elevated exit rate per year. NonEPZ firms above the threshold have the
same exit probability as firms at the threshold.
The structural hypothesis tests demonstrate a higher risk of death for almost all
nonEPZ firms, regardless of size. The one-tailed test that EPZ firms are more likely to
survive than nonEPZ firms at the threshold is not definitive. However, firms below the
threshold have a 10 percentage point higher probability of death than comparably sized
EPZ frims. For firms above the threshold, again there is a 10 percentage point higher
probability of exit for nonEPZ firms. All of these estimates easily passes critical values.
Greater exposure to the TEWA expenses and other disadvantages of nonEPZ firms
relative to EPZ firms of comparable initial size and vintage increases significantly the
likelihood that nonEPZ firms will fail.
For both EPZ and nonEPZ sectors, there is a small advantage of size – about a two
percentage point lower risk of death per year relative to smaller firms in the same sec-
tor. However, the difference is only statistically significant for the nonEPZ sector. In
addition, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a uniform firm survival probability
above and below the threshold in the EPZ sector. Therefore, survival probability does
not change significantly by firm size in the EPZ, but small nonEPZ firms do face a
higher probability of failure compared to other nonEPZ firms. However, the biggest
and most significant differences in survival probability is the higher exit rate in nonEPZ
relative to EPZ firms of equal initial size and vintage.
5.1.2 Placebo tests
We reestimated the model of firm employment growth used in Table 4 but using alter-
nate artificial threshold sizes of Lit = 20 and Lit = 30. For these placebo regressions, we
limit the sample to firms above 14 workers to take out the effect of the actual threhold.
The results are reported in Table 6 with the Table 4 results repeated in the first column.
The results in column 1 are very different from those in the last two columns. Probabil-
ity of firm growth in the nonEPZ sector below the threshold are now not significantly
different from the probability at the placibo threshold (at the threshold of 20) or posi-
tive (at the threshold of 30) rather than negative. The differences in growth rates for
nonEPZ firms above and below the threshold are now only 4–5 percentage points com-
pared to the 21 percentage points using the true thresholds. However, the EPZ firms
continue to have a growth advantage over their nonEPZ counterparts consistent with
the expected lower cost of employment expansion in the EPZ sector at all employment
levels. In addition, EPZ firms grow at equal rates above and below the placebo thresholds
which is consistent with the expected growth pattern for the EPZ sector for firms above
the true threshold. In short, the EPZ firms continue to act as expected with the placebo
thresholds while the nonEPZ firms look markedly different from their behavior about the
true thresholds. These findings buttress the validity of the findings in Table 4.
6 Conclusion
Numerous studies have explained the effect of labor market restriction on unemploy-
ment, employment growth and wage inequality in OECD countries. This study extends
Abidoye et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2014) 3:36 Page 17 of 20
this inquiry to the case of employment protection in a developing country context,
namely the TEWA in Sri Lanka. The program imposes severance costs on firms with
15 or more workers in Sri Lanka, but not on smaller firms or firms in export promo-
tion zones (EPZ).
We find that the size distribution of firms differs dramatically across the EPZ and
nonEPZ sectors, with 76% of nonEPZ firms having less than 15 workers while 77% of
EPZ firms have at least 15 employees. Using panel data on employment in the universe
of formal sector firms in Sri Lanka from 1995 to 2003, we found evidence that 62% of
EPZ firms open for business with at least 15 employees compared to only 9% of
nonEPZ firms. That implies that disproportionate sorting of large firms into EPZ ex-
plains about 80% of the gap in firm size distribution across EPZ and nonEPZ sectors.
Moreover, EPZ firms above the threshold are 14 percentage points more likely to add
workers than are comparably sized nonEPZ firms, while EPZ firms below the threshold
have an astounding 26 percentage point higher probability of growing relative to their
nonEPZ counterparts. While the large firm share of nonEPZ firms rises over time, even
Table 6 Reduced form and structural estimates of the probability of employment growth
conditional on prior employment level inside and outside Enterprise Protection Zones as
per equation (6) using Probit model with cluster robust standard errors
Reduced form parameters: EPZi = 1 T = 14
a from
Table 4
Placebo 1: T = 20a
Sample excludes Lit < 15
Placebo 2: T = 30a
Sample excludes Lit < 15
Lit≤ T−1; EL
−
it ¼ 1 : βL− þ βEPZ þ γL− 0.09** (0.02) 0.23*** (0.05) 0.25*** (0.03)
Lit = T : βEPZ 0.12* (0.08) 0.31*** (0.10) 0.36*** (0.10)
Lit≥ T þ 1; ELþit ¼ 1 : βLþ þ βEPZ þ γLþ 0.19** (0.02) 0.20*** (0.01) 0.22*** (0.01)
Reduced form parameters: EPZi = 0
Lit≤ T−1; EL
−
it ¼ 1 : βL− -0.17** (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01)
Lit = T: reference − − −
Lit≥ T þ 1; ELþit ¼ 0 : βLþ 0.048** (0.01) 0.049*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01)
Structural estimates
Hypothesis: Relative to nonEPZ firms of like size and vintageb
βEPZ > 0: EPZ firms grow faster at the
threshold
0.123** (224) 0.31** (5.7) 0.36** (18)
βEPZ þ γL− >0: EPZ firms grow faster
below the threshold
0.255** (161) 0.219** (21.63) 0.21** (49.4)
βEPZ þ γLþ > 0: EPZ firms grow faster
above the threshold
0.142** (2952) 0.15** (131) 0.14** (101)
Hypothesis: Relative to same sector firms below the thresholdb
βLþ−βL− > 0: nonEPZ firms grow faster
above the threshold
0.214** (21) 0.048** (22.6) 0.04 ** (17.65)
βLþ þ γLþð Þ− βL− þ γL−ð Þ > 0: EPZ firms
grow faster above the threshold
0.101** (42) -0.03 (42) -0.03 (0.60)
Hypothesis: Relative to EPZ firms at the thresholdb
γL− ¼ 0 : EPZ firms grow at a different
rate below the threshold
0.133* (3.5) −0.08 (3.5) −0.15 (0.14)
γLþ ¼ 0 : EPZ firms grow at a different
rate above the threshold
0.020 (0.01) −0.15 (0.01) −0.22 (0.43)
aMarginal effect reproted with attached standard error in parenthesis.
bMarginal effect reported with attached Chi-square statistic in parentheses. Critical value is 3.84 at the .05 significance
level.
*significance at the 0.1 level, **significance at the .05 level, ***significance at the .01 level.
EPZ: Export Promotion Zone.
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that turns out to be due to poor outcomes in the nonEPZ sector. Small nonEPZ firms
are slightly more likely to exit than nonEPZ firms which lowers the small firm share of
all nonEPZ firms over time. In fact, small and large nonEPZ firms are 10 percentage
points more likely to die than are their EPZ counterparts of like size and vintage.
The totality of the evidence suggests that the TEWA restrictions on firing that were
supposed to increase employment stability had exactly the opposite result. By imposing
a tax on firm growth, the system causes nonEPZ firms to inefficiently limit employ-
ment, increasing the odds that the firm will fail. While large firms atypically sort into
the EPZ and avoid the regulatory expenses, a significant number of firms are caught by
the regulatory costs. Results suggest that these firms would hire more workers and be
more likely to succeed if nonEPZ and EPZ firms operated under the same, more liberal
rules regarding the costs of hiring and firing.
Endnotes
1Sri Lanka data were compiled from the universe of formal sector firms in Sri Lanka
described later in the paper.
2Freeman (2008) presents a review of both theoretical and empirical effects of labor
market institutions. Addison and Teixeira (2001) review findings regarding the effects
of employment protection legislation.
3The rationale for the policy, as stated in the Industrial Policy of Ceylon (1971), was
that ”….the [Government] is pledged to the establishment of a socialist society. This
commitment calls for major changes in industrial policy to eliminate some of the social
and economic consequences of the policy followed in the past few years [such as] the
concentration of monopoly power in the hands of a few investors, leading to gross in-
equalities in the distribution of income and the entrenchment of privileged groups in
society … [and] the heavy reliance of local industry on imported raw material, compo-
nents and technology. . . .”.
4Incompetence is not considered a disciplinary matter. Even in the case of disciplin-
ary layoffs due to misconduct or poor discipline, the employer must inform the worker
in writing of the reasons for such termination before the second day after such termin-
ation, failing which, the worker is entitled to seek redress under the TEWA on the basis
that the termination of his services was not for disciplinary reasons.
5The others were an unreliable supply of electricity; uncertain government policy; macro-
economic instability; and the high cost of obtaining external financing (World Bank 2005).
6We should note that we have no evidence that the application for EPZ status is any-
thing but above board. We are just trying to be complete in allowing for supra-normal
application costs.
7The technology shock could also include innovations in the real price of output. To
economize on terms, we fix the output price at unity and let all changes in the value of
labor time work their way through productivity shocks.
8Ashenfelter and Card (1982) showed that wages evolve according to an AR(1)
process with first-order coefficient insignificantly different from 1, and so the random
walk assumption is not a radical departure from reality.
9In the Cobb-Douglas formulation used here, and with the restriction that capital is
fixed, the second best solution is to set employment at 14. A more general specification
could result in the second best employment level at less than 14.
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10In practice, our main parameters of interest were not sensitive to the inclusion or
exclusion of these cohort and firm-specific entry conditions.
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